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Abstract
The recent political economy literature suggests that migrants can 
affect the institutional evolution of their home countries through 
political remittances, that is, the transfer of political norms and 
attitudes (e.g., for democracy, corruption) via social networks from 
host to home countries. The main result from both cross-country 
comparisons and from country case-studies is that there is a 
democratic dividend from emigration, something that destination 
countries may want to (and occasionally do) take into account when 
setting their immigration policies.
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Introduction
Emigration can affect the political and institutional 
evolution of developing countries in many ways, 
from the self-selection of migrants’ on political views 
(Hirshman’s “exit” effect), to diasporas’ involvement 
in domestic politics.2 Another channel through 
which migrants can affect home country institutions 
is through “political remittances”, that is, the transfer 
of political norms and attitudes (regarding, for 
example, democracy and corruption) from host to 
home countries. The term “political remittances” 
is the transposition to the political realm of the 
concept of social remittances (Levitt, 1998). The 
general idea borrowed from the literature on social 
remittances is that while abroad, migrants absorb 
new information and are exposed to new political 
institutions, attitudes and practices that can first 
transform their own political views (e.g., Barr and 
Serra, 2010; Cain et al., 1991; Luttmer and Singhal, 
2011)3 and then spillover to their home communities 
through direct and indirect contacts with relatives, 
friends and other members of their home-based 
social networks (Levitt, 1998, Shain, 1999). The 
notion has inspired a large body of research in 
demography, political science and economics. 
There is a rich qualitative and descriptive socio-
political literature documenting the phenomenon, 
however the quantitative evidence is both scarce 
and weak. Still, this socio-political literature has a 
few important insights that can guide empirical 
research. First, “destination matters”: if migrants are 
to transfer the political attitudes and institutional 
norms of their host countries, then, depending on 
where they are, they will remit different norms and 
values. And second, “timing matters”: it takes time 
for individual preferences to evolve, and even more 
time for these preferences to be transferred and 
digested by recipients in the home countries. 
The recent economic literature includes both cross-
country comparisons and a number of country case-
studies. They converge in suggesting that emigration 
2. See Lodigiani (2016) for an overview of this literature.
3. Careja and Emmenegger (2012) and Doyle and Fidrmuc 
(2004) study migrant assimilation with regard to political 
attitudes in the context of Eastern Europe.
entails a significant democratic dividend when 
emigration is directed toward democratic countries 
(destination matters); careful country-case studies 
moreover suggest that a good deal of the effect can 
be attributed to the transfer of political attitudes and 
preferences that, after some time (time matters), also 
translate into political outcomes (e.g., elections) at 
home.
Emigration and democracy:  
cross-country comparisons
In an influential paper, Spilimbergo (2009) used 
cross-country comparisons in a panel setting to show 
that foreign-trained individuals promote democracy 
in their home countries, but only if foreign education 
was acquired in a democratic destination. While 
he does not identify the mechanisms at work, he 
suggests a number of possible channels (e.g., access 
to foreign media, acquisition of norms and values 
while abroad that diffuse at home upon return, 
willingness to preserve the quality of one’s network 
abroad, etc.) that can be generalized to other 
migration experiences as well. This is precisely what 
Docquier et al. (2016) are doing: they estimate the 
effect of emigration on home-country institutions 
for all migrants, not just foreign students, and 
find that openness to migration, as measured by 
the total emigration rate, contributes to improved 
institutional quality.
Both papers investigate the overall impact of 
emigration on home-country institutions. This 
overall effect is composed of the direct (or exit) effect 
of emigration, that is, the fact that emigrants may 
be positively self-selected in terms of education and 
preferences for democracy (which should translate 
into a negative impact on democracy at home) and 
indirect effects such as political remittances or the 
role of diasporas. The two papers are similar in terms 
of methodology – they use dynamic panel regressions 
and similar dependent variables (i.e., indices of 
democracy such as the Polity IV index or indices of 
Civil Liberties and Political Rights published yearly 
by the Freedom House). They, then, try to confront 
the obvious endogeneity issue arising from the fact 
that bad political institutions can generate either 
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more (due to stronger push factors) or less (due to 
repressive policies) emigration, creating a spurious 
correlation between the size of emigration and 
the quality of institutions. Beyond their focus on 
different emigrant populations (foreign students v. 
all migrants), the two papers differ in many other 
respects.
First, Spilimbergo (2009) uses data on the number 
of people with foreign training living either abroad 
or at home, making it impossible to know whether 
the effect uncovered is due to those staying abroad 
or to those who returned. In terms of analogy with 
monetary remittances, this is similar to trying to 
make a distinction between remittances per se 
(that is, money sent by migrants residing abroad) 
and repatriated savings upon return. Docquier et 
al. (2016), in contrast, use an emigration variable 
that consists of the lagged accumulated stock of 
individuals (aged 25+) born in the home country 
and living abroad, and which would seem to exclude 
return migration as the main channel for the effect.4
Second, Spilimbergo’s (2009) main result is the 
identification of destination-specific effects, with 
a positive coefficient obtained only when foreign 
education comes from a democratic country. In 
Docquier et al. (2016), the panel specifications 
use immigration data to OECD destinations only, 
and given that these destination countries are very 
homogenous in terms of democratic performance 
this means that it is impossible to test for the effect 
of emigration to democratic v. non-democratic 
countries. However, in their cross-sectional 
specifications, they are able to use immigration data 
for the full sample of world countries and to confirm 
4. The migration data are taken from Bruecker, Capuano, 
and Marfouk (2013). Focusing on twenty OECD desti-
nation countries, they computed emigration stocks and 
rates of the population aged 25 years and older by gender 
and educational attainment in five-year intervals from 
1980 to 2010. The data are obtained by harmonizing na-
tional censuses and population registers statistics from 
the receiving countries. The twenty destination countries 
covered represent more than 90 percent of the OECD 
total immigration stock. A limitation of these data sets, 
however, is that they are silent about return migration. 
Return migrants are simply part of the domestic popula-
tion.
that all of the positive effect of emigration on 
democracy is due to emigration to the democratic 
countries. 
Finally and most importantly, the main robust result 
in Spilimbergo (2009) is the positive coefficient 
of the “democratic norm at destination” variable; 
this is a weighted average of democratic scores at 
destination, which captures whether emigration 
is directed toward more or less democratic 
countries. The interpretation is that what matters 
for democratization is whether students study in 
a democratic country, not how many of them do 
so. For this, one must interact this “democratic 
norm at destination” variable with the number of 
foreign students; however, in all of Spilimbergo’s 
specifications but one, this interaction term is not 
significant. In contrast, Docquier et al.’s (2016) main 
results are for the volume of migration, suggesting 
that whether a country has a one or twenty percent 
emigration rate makes a difference, not just whether 
its emigration is directed toward destinations with 
high or low democracy scores.
In terms of estimation methods, Spilimbergo 
(2009) relies on SGMM estimation with internal 
instruments while Docquier et al. (2016) use a 
large set of different specifications: cross-sectional 
analysis (OLS and 2SLS), and panel analysis (OLS, 
OLS with fixed-effects, 2SLS, and SGMM) and 
for different indices of institutional quality. In all 
of these models, emigration consistently turns 
positive and very significant. The long-run effect 
of emigration estimated in 2SLS cross-sectional 
and panel regressions stands between 1.2 and 1.5, 
depending on the specification.5
These results are shown to be also robust across 
sub-samples (excluding oil countries, Sub-Saharan 
African countries, or former Communist countries). 
Interestingly, there is no apparent additional effect 
for skilled emigration.
Lodigiani and Salomone (2016) analyze another, 
more specific dimension of democracy: the role 
of women in politics as measured by the share of 
5.  This means that a 10 percentage-point change in the emi-
gration rate increases the standardized democracy indi-
ces (which range between – 1 and +1) by .12 to .15.
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female members of the National Parliament. In the 
spirit of the political remittances literature above, 
they hypothesize that international migration to 
countries where the share of women in the parliament 
is higher is likely to increase female parliamentary 
share in the source country. 
The authors’ main variable of interest is the index of 
female parliamentary share, which is constructed as 
the difference in female parliamentary participation 
between host and home countries, weighted by the 
share of migrants to that host country on the overall 
population (as in Spilimbergo, 2009). They include 
country of origin and time fixed effects, control for 
important economic and socio-political covariates 
such as female education, the type of electoral 
system, or general wealth in the society, and address 
reverse causality using a gravity-based model to 
predict bilateral migration stocks (as in Ortega and 
Peri, 2014, Alesina et al., 2016 or Docquier et al., 
2016). The paper uses information on the gender 
composition of national parliaments between 1960 
and 2003 and bilateral migration data between 1960 
and 2000, which they combine with other databases 
to construct a panel data set of 170 countries over 
five decades. 
Their results suggest that international migration 
to countries with higher female parliamentary 
participation have a positive and significant effect 
on the female parliamentary share at origin (by 
about 1.7 percentage points for a 10-percentage 
point increase in migration). This holds under all 
specifications and is robust to excluding certain 
subsamples (such as post-communist, Muslim, and 
Sub-Saharan African countries). 
Overall, this cross-country literature demonstrates a 
total positive impact of emigration on home-country 
institutions. While the generality of the results is 
important in its own right, the main limitation 
of these studies is that they cannot disentangle 
the relative contributions of the potentially many 
channels involved. In particular, they cannot isolate 
the diffusion of democratic norms (namely, political 
remittances) from other candidate explanations. For 
this, a more detailed analysis is required, at a more 
disaggregated level.
Country case studies
Country case-studies generally use administrative 
or individual data (or both). The fact that they focus 
on smaller entities for which richer information is 
available allows for a deeper exploration of alternative 
channels. The micro literature includes a number 
of country case-studies. For example, Batista and 
Vincente (2011) document that households in Cape 
Verde with a migrant abroad, particularly those 
with a migrant to the US, have a higher demand 
for political accountability. Pérez-Armendáriz and 
Crow (2010) find that individuals in Mexico in 
households with a migrant in the US or Canada are 
more likely to vote. Chauvet and Mercier (2014) 
also focus on voter turnout and report a similar 
result for Mali. Pfutze (2012) studies Mexico’s local 
elections of 2000 and shows that municipalities with 
many migrants in the US are more likely to vote for 
opposition parties. These papers are all interesting 
and carefully executed, however they all suffer 
from one or both of the two following issues: they 
study a country with a single foreign destination 
(as is the case for Mexico), making it impossible to 
analyze destination-specific effects; or they concern 
countries with very long migration traditions, 
making it impossible to control for pre-migration 
political preferences and outcomes.
These issues are addressed in Barsbai et al. (2016) for 
Moldova. The authors take advantage of the natural 
experiment constituted by the Russian crisis of 
1998, which sparked emigration out of Moldova, a 
country with previously no ties to the West and very 
little emigration even to other former Soviet Union 
Republics, as it was highly specialized in agriculture 
and dependent on agricultural exports to Russia. 
This lack of export diversification is precisely why 
Moldova was harder hit by the crisis (much more 
than Russia). In the few years after the crisis more 
than 20 percent of the workforce emigrated: two 
thirds went to Russia (“East”) and one third to 
the European Union (West). Interestingly, while 
certain Moldovan communities had predominantly 
westward emigration during that period others 
had predominantly eastward emigration: but these 
communities behave in similar ways politically, that 
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is, they had similar electoral behavior. In particular, 
the share of votes for the Communist Party, which 
was in power between 2001 and 2009, were very 
close in the elections of 1998, 2001 and 2005, and 
it is only in the 2009 and 2010 elections that the 
two types of communities (from an emigration 
viewpoint) started to diverge politically, as shown of 
Figure 1.
Barsbai et al. (2016) explore the reasons behind 
this divergence and show that it can be “causally” 
explained by the differential effects of Eastward v. 
Westward emigration. They show that emigration 
to Western Europe in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s substantially affected electoral outcomes in 
the Moldovan national elections of 2009 and 2010, 
increasing the share of votes for democratic parties 
The black line shows the unweighted average share of Communist votes across all communities. The blue and red lines show how 
communities with high levels of emigration to the West and communities with high levels of emigration to the East deviate from 
the overall trend. We plot residual shares of Communist votes controlling for the same set of pre-migration community-level 
variables as our baseline specification (see column 3 of Table A5) apart from the 1998 election results. Communities with high 
levels emigration to the West (East) are defined as having an above median prevalence of westward (eastward) migration and 
above 50 percent share of westward (eastward) migrants among all migrants. Bars show the overall number of emigrants in stocks 
(in 1000). Data come from yearly waves of the Moldovan Labor Force Survey. Pre-2006 numbers of emigrants are adjusted to 
account for a change in the sampling method of the Moldovan Labor Force Survey. Data on emigration from Moldova before 1999 
are not available. The first wave of the Moldovan Labor Force Survey was conducted in 1999, just after the unexpected Russian 
financial crisis hit Moldova in late 1998 and triggered the first big wave of emigration. Information on destination countries is 
not available in pre-2006 waves. The same trend in the number of migrants is observable using data on Moldova immigrants 
from major destination countries. In 1998, for example, only 15 Moldovan immigrants were registered in Italy. This number 
increased to 40,000 by 2004. A similar development occurred in other destination countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain 
(see footnote 10 for sources and more details). The orange line shows the volume of international calls to Moldova (in 1000 hours 
per week). Data come the International Traffic Database compiled by Telegeography.
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Table 1: Est/West Migration and General Election Results in Moldova, July 2009
 
 
 
Share of votes for the  
Communist Party (%)
 
Share of votes for  
opposition parties (%)
Basic con-
trols
Plus pre-
migration 
election 
results
Plus night-
time light (full 
model)
  Liberal Demo-
cratic Party
Liberal 
Party
Demo-
cratic 
Party
Party Alliance 
Our Moldova
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prevalence of 
emigration to 
the West (%)
-0.70*** -0.63*** -0.63***   0.40*** 0.24** 0.08 -0.16
(0.20) (0.18) (0.18)   (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15)
Prevalence of 
emigration to 
the East (%)
0.44** 0.39** 0.39**   -0.07 -0.17** -0.07 -0.01
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16)   (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Basic controls yes yes yes   yes yes yes yes
Pre-migration 
election results
- yes yes   yes yes yes yes
Night-time light - - yes   yes yes yes yes
District fixed 
effects
yes yes yes   yes yes yes yes
Number of 
observations
848 848 848   848 848 848 848
R2 0.78 0.82 0.82   0.56 0.66 0.42 0.37
The table reports OLS estimates for 848 Moldovan communities. The dependent variables are the vote shares of different parties 
in the July 2009 parliamentary election at the community level (in percent). Table A3 in the appendix shows the full regression 
results. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at 
the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
and reducing that of the then ruling Communist 
Party (and conversely for emigration to Russia and 
other Eastern European destinations), strongly 
enough to overturn the election results (which were 
just won by a coalition of democratic, pro-European 
parties). They also provide suggestive evidence 
that the observed effects likely work through the 
diffusion of information and of norms from abroad.
Note that the above results cannot be explained by the 
self-selection of liberal individuals into emigration 
to the West; such bias would work the other way 
round, that is, should increase, not decrease the 
share of votes for the communists where there 
is more westward emigration (as liberal-minded 
voters would have voted against the communists had 
they stayed instead of emigrating). However, at the 
community level this bias may still exist, meaning 
that individuals living in more liberal communities 
tend to emigrate more to the West. In order to tackle 
this problem the authors control for pre-emigration 
electoral outcomes and thus measure the change in 
electoral outcomes driven by emigration. They also 
control for a rich set of geographic and demographic 
(including ethnic composition) community 
characteristics, the intensity of the economic shock 
following the Russian crisis, and a district fixed-
effect.
Table 1 summarizes the main results from their 
analysis. The first three columns investigate the 
relationship between migration patterns and 
Communist votes in the parliamentary election of 
July 2009. The columns gradually expand the set of 
control variables and check the robustness of the 
results against potentially important confounders.
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The  interpretation of the coefficients  is 
straightforward as both migration prevalence 
and share of votes are measured in percentages: a 
one percentage point increase in the community 
prevalence of westward migration reduces the 
Communist vote share by about 0.6 percentage 
points. The stepwise inclusion of district fixed 
effects using smaller (grid-generated) geographical 
units slightly lowers the magnitudes but does 
not affect the significance of the coefficients of 
interest. Additionally, the authors find that electoral 
divergence across communities only sets in with 
a time-lag, supporting their hypothesis about the 
diffusion of values channel. This is further supported 
by the fact that the effect on electoral outcomes is 
strongest for communities with a larger share of low-
educated residents and with a higher share of people 
who grew up under the Soviet regime), because these 
are communities where the transmission of values, 
presumably, has the largest informational value.
Conclusion
The main conclusion to draw from the reviewed 
literature on political remittances is that there is a 
democratic dividend from emigration. This has 
strong policy implications for sending and receiving 
countries. For sending countries’ governments, this 
democratic dividend may or may not be welcome. 
Autocratic government may be inspired to prevent 
communication between emigrants with their 
relatives, discourage return, or prevent emigration 
in the first place. And indeed, countries such as 
China (mostly until the 1990s), the Soviet Union, 
Cuba, North Korea, Iran or, today, Venezuela 
have seen various combinations of such restrictive 
policies. From the perspective of receiving countries, 
the main implication is that immigration policy 
also has a diplomatic dimension. This has not yet 
been recognized by most governments but has 
long been recognized by some. For example, the 
US Government created a number of visiting and 
exchange programs such as the Fulbright Program 
or the Exchange Visitors Program (the J-1 visa) 
with the explicit objective of using these programs 
as part of the US public diplomacy efforts, bringing 
people (even temporarily) to the United States, 
exposing them to US institutions and then counting 
on this transformative experience to disseminate 
American values and democracy throughout the 
world. According to the above reviewed literature, 
this would seem a good use of US taxpayer’s money.
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